Few would dispute the claim that Erich von Manstein ranked among, if not the best, operational-level military commanders of World War II. However, due to Manstein’s decisions during and after the War, he also ranks among the most controversial figures of the War. However, despite Manstein’s central role in the war, no official biography of him has been written. In Field Marshal von Manstein, The Head of Janus, a portrait noted military historian Marcel Stein addresses this gap in scholarship on the war. In doing so, Stein has driven a stake into the heart of long-standing myths regarding Manstein and his role in the war. Furthermore, Stein also broadened the scope of his work and skillfully explained the general moral decline of the German General Staff, its involvement in the Holocaust, and its central place in the mismanagement of the German war effort.
Manstein stood as a symbol of everything that explained the incredible tactical and operational military prowess of the German Wermacht during the war, and its moral turpitude. Perhaps the most important value that Stein’s work provides for military history enthusiasts, among many, is how Stein links his discussion of Manstein to larger themes that mark the War and how we have come to remember it.
For example, Stein uses Manstein as a vehicle to explain how deeply involved the German General Staff and field commanders were in the Holocaust; as well as how they selfishly shaped a wildly inaccurate picture of the war. Stein regularly departs from his discussion of Manstein’s career to explain how the adoption of National Socialist ideology by the German officer corps corrupted a centuries-old tradition of military excellence. As a result, although the Third Reich was able to call on a far more talented officer corps than Imperial Germany possessed in World War I, the characteristic criminal behavior of the Wermacht officer corps played a central role in the destruction of the Third Reich. Reich.
Stein demonstrates how Hitler’s best military leaders, men like Manstein, sometimes achieved impressive victories but, perhaps as a result, constantly underestimated and misunderstood the strength and power of a Red Army that ultimately played a central role in the destruction of the National Socialist experiment. For example, and for one thing, Manstein was an operational genius. He was the author of the plan that defeated the combined force of the British, French, Belgian and Dutch armies in a few weeks. Whereas only twenty years before and after four years of war, Imperial Germany had not done the same. Furthermore, Manstein’s leadership of a Motorized Corps during the first months of Barbarossa clearly established him as one of the best leaders of large mobile units of the War. Manstein added to this reputation when, early in 1943, he launched a counterattack so stunning that he drove the Red Army back. Manstein’s counteroffensive, despite the fact that it had followed the Red Army’s greatest success to date in the war, convinced Zhukov and Stalin that they needed to marshal the available Red Army strength to take up a defensive position later that year and postpone his plans to take the offensive until later that year. after the anticipated German summer offensive at Kursk.
The events at Kursk would prove critical to understanding the link between Manstein’s failings and the mistakes made by his peers in the higher ranks of the German officer corps. At Kursk, perhaps one of two elements explaining Manstein’s often-ignored shortcomings as a military leader was best revealed; his monumental arrogance and his consequent inability to admit when he had made a mistake. Manstein’s cavalier approach to fighting the Red Army took center stage in the events at Kursk. Manstein played a central role in convincing Hitler to launch the Operational Citadel despite the fact that the Red Army had turned the Kursk salient into one of the strongest fortresses in the world; a fact of which the Germans were well aware. Then, after Citadel failed to achieve its stated goals, Manstein ignored reality and pushed for the offensive to continue. Manstein then did not take responsibility for the failure of the Citadel even as the Red Army launched its own summer offensive and brought several German armies to breaking point.
Manstein’s second major flaw, as far as his military leadership was concerned, was his overt ambition and concomitant desire to head the German General Staff; an ambition that featured prominently on numerous occasions during the war. Manstein’s ambition was most dramatically revealed in his repeated attempts to cover up his own mistakes. A command failure that was most frequently revealed during his leadership of the 11th Army and Army Group Don; when in both cases he avoided making critical decisions. For example, in his role as commander of Army Group Don, Manstein apparently refused to make a decision of his own and did not issue an unequivocal breakout order from the Stalingrad pocket; an order that may have saved part of the encircled German Sixth Army. Manstein’s lack of courage regarding circumventing Hitler’s orders demonstrated how Manstein put his own professional goals first; moral cowardice was part and parcel of his leadership style. In addition, Manstein frequently threw his subordinates to the wolves; ostensibly out of fear of Hitler’s wrath even though many other high-ranking German military leaders would ignore Hitler’s orders during the war and emerge relatively unscathed despite their transgressions. These men, like Hausser and Model, at important moments in the war put their men first, even though that could have spelled the end of their careers.
Manstein was more than emblematic of the successes and failures of the German army on the battlefield. Stein also helps the reader understand the simmering anti-Semitism and racism that pervaded the German officer corps during the war by exploring Manstein’s regular involvement in the genocide that defines the Wermacht campaign in Eastern Europe. Stein’s findings help illustrate the criminal depravity of the German officer corps in not only ignoring the laws of war, but also in aiding in the genocide of millions of Slavs, Jews, Gypsies, and other innocent human beings.
Additionally, Stein also examines how after the war, Manstein led the way in reshaping the historiography of the war. Under Manstein’s influence, this historiography flowed from an image and myth created by the leading German military figures who survived the war. Unfortunately, this myth has held up surprisingly well over time. A myth that has led millions to believe that the Wermacht did not participate in the genocide, but rather served as a professional and honorable institution that not only stood above the slaughter perpetrated by the SS, but also knew next to nothing about it. . Furthermore, not only did the Wermacht allegedly fight with clean hands, according to Manstein and his followers, but these men also planted a myth arguing that if the Wermacht had run the war without Hitler’s interference, Germany would have won. Stein’s book, if for no other reason, is important reading in the way he comprehensively debunks these pernicious myths.
Stein’s work spans decades of German military history. The first half of the book provides a summary of Manstein’s career, then proceeds through an in-depth investigation of the major events of his career. These chapters include a look at Manstein’s great military achievements, as well as his mistakes; with the Battle for France, Manstein’s leadership of Army Group Don, and the German assault on Kursk, including the planning phase, covered in detail. The second half of the book first examines Manstein’s decision to support Hitler and refuse to join the German military resistance movement. The book then describes Manstein’s involvement in the Holocaust, his trial for war crimes after the war, and ends by demolishing Manstein’s post-war attempts to present himself in the best possible light.
My complaints with work are minor. Although not an operational or tactical military history, a few more maps would have been helpful. The book covers events taking place throughout Europe; in particular, some of the towns mentioned in the Soviet Union are obscure even to the well-informed reader. Additional maps could have been of great help in understanding where these events occurred. Also, the editing was a bit sloppy at times, not enough to detract from the book’s strengths, but enough to prove to be a bit annoying and potentially a cause of confusion for someone with a cursory knowledge of the War.
Overall, Stein’s book is a valuable addition to the available literature on the war. Stein’s work fills important gaps in what is widely known about the War, adds to what is being known about the Wermacht’s involvement in the Holocaust, and helps to destroy decades of myths that still prevail today; more than sixty years after the war ended. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about Germany and World War II.
